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Abstract
This paper examines the role of the labour share in creating instability in a small open econ-
omy. We assume that ﬁnancial markets are imperfect so that entrepreneurs are credit constrained,
and that this constraint is tighter for low levels of ﬁnancial development. Aghion, Bacchetta and
Banerjee (2004) have shown that as the degree of ﬁnancial development increases, output rises
but instability appears for intermediate levels of ﬁnancial development. Crucially, they assume
that labour is paid before production takes place, and hence crises are solely due to the increased
cost of debt repayment as ﬁrms accumulate capital. We show that under the more reasonable
assumption that wages are paid at the end of the period, changes in the labour share also play a
role in eroding proﬁtability. Our analysis also predicts that ﬁnancial crises are associated with
substantial movements in the sharing of value added between capital and labour.
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1 Introduction
The ﬁnancial liberalization which took place at the end of the seventies for industrial countries, and in
the nineties for developing ones, has been justiﬁed by many arguments. Financial liberalization is sup-
posed to increase market efﬁciency by creating possibilities for diversiﬁcation and leading to a better
allocation of investment (see Fama (1970)). Opening up ﬁnancial markets is expected to increase the
productive capital stock in a country by facilitating borrowing for entrepreneurs. As a result, the grow-
ing capital ﬂows that we have observed are supposed to have created new investment possibilities and
promoted growth. Moreover the diversiﬁcation resulting from the deregulation of ﬁnancial markets
should have reduced volatility. This last argument, however, does not seem to be supported by empir-
ical evidence. First, there are no empirical cross-country studies showing that ﬁnancial liberalization
stabilizes an economy, whereas there is some evidence of a positive correlation between ﬁnancial
integration and volatility; see Kose et al. (2002). Second, the experience of Argentina, Mexico, Rus-
sia, and the South-East Asian countries seems to indicate that periods of ﬁnancial liberalization have
coincided with ﬁnancial crises in emerging countries.
The literature has found several explanations of ﬁnancial crises, from herd behavior to corruption,
trade imbalances or excessive external claims. Here we follow Aghion et al. (2004) who show that
opening up ﬁnancial markets leads to endogenous volatility when ﬁrms face credit constraints. Fi-
nancial market imperfections are central in the analysis of procyclicity of capital ﬂows, as shown by
Kaminsky et al. (2004), and are hence a possible cause of crises. Moreover, since ﬁrms in emerging
countries are more likely to face credit constraints than those in developed countries, the developing
economies are particularly vulnerable.
The central role of credit constraints in inducing volatility has been emphasized by Bernanke and
Gertler (1989), and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in a closed economy, but has received little attention
in open-economy setups, the exception being Aghion et al. (2004), Pintus (2006) and Caballé et al.
(2006). The existence of a borrowing constraint can be justiﬁed by the presence of asymmetric in-
formation between lenders and borrowers which gives rise to moral hazard, and makes it optimal for
lenders to require collateral. In this paper we do not provide any microfoundations for credit market
imperfections, but follow Aghion et al. (2004) and simply assume that entrepreneurs can borrow an
amount that is proportional to the entrepreneur’s wealth. The ratio of loan to wealth can be seen as
measure of the degree of ﬁnancial market development, as in Aghion et al. (2004).
Our analysis differs from Aghion et al. (2004) in that we emphasize the role of the labour share in
generating cycles. Recent empirical evidence has shown that the the labour share varies substantially
both across countries and over time.1 Our interest in the role of the labour share is motivated by the
work of Diwan (1999). Using data for the last decades of the 20th century, Diwan ﬁnds that in most
countries the labour share increased before a ﬁnancial crisis,2 and fell by an average of 6.12 percentage
points following the crisis. In many instances, the labour share did not return to its pre-crisis value,
indicating that crises tend to be associated with a permanent transfer of income from labour to capital.
This evidence raises the question of why is it that the labour share ﬂuctuates together with output.
We make two crucial assumptions. First, as in Aghion et al. (1999) and Aghion et al. (2004), we
distinguish between investors and lenders in the sense that not all individuals are capable of becoming
entrepreneurs. Second, we assume that output is produced by a CES production function and suppose
that labour and capital are complements, in line with existing evidence for low- and middle-income
countries; see Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000). Contrary to ﬁnancial capital 3, labour is supposed to
be immobile across countries, and hence the wage rate is equivalent to the real exchange rate.
Aghion et al. (2004) make the unusual assumption that wages are paid before production takes
place, which implies that a higher labour share does not affect ’proﬁts’ and hence has no impact
on the entrepreneurs borrowing capacity. In this paper we make the more standard assumption that
the wage bill is paid after production has taken place, which implies that as capital accumulates and
the labour share rises, proﬁtability declines. Two main results emerge. First, we show that in this
case ﬂuctuations appear for much lower levels of ﬁnancial development. Second, the elasticity of
substitution in production becomes an essential determinant of the dynamics of capital and output,
and volatility is greater the stronger the complementarity between capital and labour is.
Section 2 describes the model, the process of wealth accumulation and the role of the labour share.
Section 3 obtains the dynamics of capital and the labour share. Section 4 examines why cycles are
1See, for example, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (2003), Harrison (2002), Bertola (1993), Daudey and Garcia-Peñalosa
(2007) and as well Solow (1958) and Kravis (1959).
2According to Frankel and Rose (1995), the ﬁnancial crisis is deﬁned as a year in which nominal exchange rate depreci-
ates more than 25%
3note that we do not allow for foreign direct investment
more likely to happen when wages are paid at the end of each period, and we then provide some
numerical examples. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Production and Preferences
We consider a small open economy, with a single good Y produced with capital and labour. The
economy is populated by two distinct categories of individuals. On the one hand, there are L worker-
lenders in the economy, who cannot directly invest in production. They can lend their wealth to
domestic entrepreneurs or in the international ﬁnancial market, and they are employed by the en-
trepreneurs. On the other, there are N identical entrepreneurs who can invest directly in production.
They employ those who are not entrepreneurs, hence L denotes also the aggregate labour supply.
They may also borrow in order to use a capital stock larger than their own wealth. For simplicity we
suppose that N = 1.
We suppose that all entrepreneurs have an identical production function characterized by constant
returns to scale. As a result we can deﬁne an aggregate production function, which will depend on
the aggregate (or average) stock of capital, K, and on labour, L. We suppose that entrepreneurs’
production function is of the constant elasticity of substitution form,
Y = A[K−ρ + L−ρ]−1/ρ, with ρ > −1 and ρ = 0 (1)
and that the ﬁnal good is the numeraire. We also deﬁne output per worker as
y = A[1 + k−ρ]−1/ρ, (2)
where y ≡ Y/L and k ≡ K/L is the capital-labour ratio. The elasticity of substitution between cap-
ital and labour is σ = 1/(1 + ρ), and plays an important role in our analysis. Most empirical studies
ﬁnd that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is less than one (see Hamermesh
(1996)), with estimates ranging between 0.06 and 0.75. Duffy and Papageorgiou (2000) ﬁnd that in
countries with low levels of capital intensity, which is generally the case for developing economies,
this parameter is signiﬁcantly lower than unity, supporting the complementarity between capital and
labour in developing countries 4. In what follows we will hence suppose that capital and labour are
complements, that is ρ > 0, implying σ < 1.
Labor is assumed to be immobile, inelastic and constant. The labour market is competitive, hence
labour is paid its marginal product and there is full employment. Capital is assumed to be internation-
ally mobile,5 although we allow only for international ﬂows of ﬁnancial capital and not for foreign
direct investment. Moreover, we assume that capital fully depreciates each period so that the invest-
ment of entrepreneurs at time t is equal to the capital stock Kt. The international capital market clears
at a gross interest rate r which is exogenous to our economy and assumed to be lower than total factor
productivity in the economy, i.e. r < A We suppose, however, that ﬁnancial markets are imperfect
and that entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Entrepreneurs can only borrow up to a fraction µ > 0
of their current wealth Wt. This fraction is assumed to be constant and exogenous,6 following Aghion
et al. (2004) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989). We can interpret this parameter as the degree of ﬁnan-
cial liberalization in the economy, with a higher value of µ implying greater ﬁnancial liberalization.
As Aghion et al. (2004), we suppose that all agents consume a ﬁxed fraction α of their end of
period wealth, where 0<α < 1, and hence they save a fraction (1− α) of it.
2.2 Factor returns, proﬁts and the labour share
2.2.1 Factor returns
Labour market is perfect hence labour is paid its marginal product:
w ≡ ∂Y
∂L
= A
(
1 + k−ρ
)− 1+ρ
ρ . (3)
Note that since labour is speciﬁc to the country, we can interpret the wage w as the exchange rate.
The return to capital is :
4The theoretical foundations for such result have been provided by Miyagiwa and Papageorgiou (2007) in a multi-
sectorial model.
5As argues by Rodrik (1998), among others, labour is much less mobile than capital.
6Particularly it does not depend on the interest rare
q ≡ ∂Y
∂K
= A(1 + kρ)−
1+ρ
ρ . (4)
If the entrepreneurs are unconstrained, the marginal product of capital is equal to the interest rate.
However, when the borrowing constraint is binding, entrepreneurs cannot invest as much as as they
want and the level of capital stock is lower than the optimal one. Then, the marginal product of capital
is greater than the interest rate.
2.2.2 Proﬁts and the labour share
Assuming that wages are paid after production takes place, we can deﬁne proﬁts 7 as output minus the
wage bill, that is,
Π ≡ Y − wL.
Substituting for the wage (3) and for output per worker (2) we obtain proﬁt per worker, denoted π,
which is given by :
π ≡ Π
L
= Ak−ρ
(
1 + k−ρ
)− 1+ρ
ρ . (5)
We are interested in the role of the labour share. We deﬁne it as the ratio of total employee
compensation to output and denote it by θ where
θ ≡ wL
Y
=
1
1 + k−ρ
. (6)
This relationship is important and will be used all along our analysis. It implies that for each capital-
labour ratio there is a unique level of the labour share, and vice versa.
Note that per capita output can be expressed as a function of the labour share, namely,
y = Aθ1/ρ. (7)
For ρ > 0, a higher labour share is associated with higher level of output per-worker. The reason for
this is that, with ρ > 0, a higher capital-labour ratio results in both a higher labour share and higher
7Note that Π are gross proﬁts, i.e. proﬁts before debt has been repaid. For simplicity, we will simply term them proﬁts
per capita output. Similarly, the marginal products of labour and capital can also be written in terms
of labour share,
w = Aθ
1+ρ
ρ , (8)
q = A(1− θ) 1+ρρ . (9)
Proﬁt per worker can also be deﬁned as a function of the labour share. By deﬁnition, proﬁt per
worker is the share of value added received by the entrepreneurs after having paid labour costs, that is
π = (1− θ)y(θ) = A(1− θ)θ1/ρ. (10)
We can immediately see that the labour share has two opposite effects on proﬁts. First, there is
a direct effect as a higher labour share tends to reduce proﬁts for a given level of output; second, a
higher labour share is associated with higher output per worker, and hence tends to increase proﬁts.
2.2.3 The effect of capital accumulation on proﬁts and on the labour share
We now examine the effect that capital accumulation has on the labour share and proﬁts. Differenti-
ating equation (6) we have
dθ
dk
=
ρk−(1+ρ)
(1 + k−ρ)2
which is positive if ρ > 0 and negative for ρ < 0. Hence, under our assumption that labour and capital
are complements, the labour share increases with capital accumulation. Although capital accumula-
tion tends to raise capital intensity and hence the capital share, it also reduces the marginal product
of capital. When capital and labour are complements, the second effect dominates, hence the capital
share falls and the labour share increases.
Consider now the effect of capital accumulation on proﬁts. From equation (5) we can show that8
∂π
∂k
> 0 if and only if k−ρ > ρ. (11)
8We examine the effect on proﬁts per worker, but all the analysis could be done in terms of aggregate proﬁts with
equivalent results since ∂Π/∂K = ∂π/∂k .
From this condition we can immediately infer that if ρ < 0, then dπ/dk > 0 for all k implying that in
this case proﬁts always increase with capital accumulation. However, for ρ > 0, the effect of capital
accumulation on proﬁts is non-monotonic. Proﬁts ﬁrst increase and then decrease, and there exists a
threshold level of the capital-labour ratio k ≡ ρ−1/ρ such that for k < k then dπ/dk > 0, while for
k > k proﬁts are decreasing in k.
To understand this note that it is possible to express the threshold as a threshold in terms of the
labour share. Indeed, dπ/dk > 0 if and only if θ < θ, where
θ ≡ σ = 1
1 + ρ
A higher capital-labour ratio has two effects on proﬁts. First, it increases output per worker and hence
proﬁtability. At the same time, and under our assumption that σ < 1, a higher capital-labour ratio
raises the labour share and reduces the capital share. For small values of k, and hence of the labour
share, the output effect dominates; as the capital-labour ratio rises the labour share becomes so high
that any further increase in θ actually leads to a reduction in proﬁtability.
It is important to note that the behavior of proﬁts in equilibrium differs from that of individual
proﬁts. From the point of view of an individual entrepreneur, who takes the wage as given, proﬁts are
always increasing in his own stock of capital (see Appendix).
2.3 Capital accumulation
The dynamics of the model are driven by the accumulation of capital by entrepreneurs. In order
to obtain the dynamic equation for capital we need to know whether or not entrepreneurs are credit
constrained. Deﬁne the optimal capital stock, denoted Ku, as the stock that equates the marginal
product of capital to the interest rate, which is given by:
Ku =
((
A
r
) ρ
1+ρ − 1
)1/ρ
L ≡ kuL (12)
An entrepreneur with wealth Wt can invest at most (1 + µ)Wt, then
Kt ≤ (1 + µ)Wt.
If (1 + µ)Wt is superior to Ku, then entrepreneurs are unconstrained and they invest at every
period the optimal level of productive capital Ku. In this case, the capital stock jumps to the level Ku
and there are no dynamics. Given our assumption on savings, the wealth of entrepreneurs is given by
Wt+1 = (1−α)rWt. As long as their savings are less than Ku they will borrow, while once they have
accumulated sufﬁcient wealth to ﬁnance Ku, they will lend their reminding savings at the market rate
r.
If the maximum level of capital that entrepreneurs can invest is below Ku then they are credit
constrained. They borrow as much as they can, that is µWt. In this case, the capital stock invested at
t is proportional to the wealth of entrepreneurs and given by :
Kt = (1 + µ)Wt (13)
Our assumption on the saving rate together with the binding credit constraint implies that we can write
the wealth of the entrepreneurs at time t + 1 as a function of proﬁts and the level of wealth at t,
Wt+1 = (1− α)[Πt − rµWt], (14)
where the term rµWt represents the debt repayment and Πt are the proﬁts received by an entrepreneur.
3 Dynamic behavior
3.1 Capital accumulation with borrowing constraint
If the borrowing constraint is binding, the capital stock is proportional to wealth (13) which implies
that, given the expressions for wealth (14), we can write the dynamic equation for the stock of capital
as follows:
Kt+1 = Φ(Kt) = (1 + µ)(1− α)
[
Πt − rµ1 + µKt
]
. (15)
Rewriting (15) in terms of capital per worker, and substituting for proﬁts (5), we obtain the dy-
namic equation for the stock of capital per worker 9:
9See appendix for the dynamics of the labour share
kt+1 = ϕ(kt) = (1 + µ)(1− α)
[
Ak−ρt (1 + k
−ρ
t )
− 1+ρ
ρ − rµ
1 + µ
kt
]
. (16)
Before we examine under which conditions the economy is constrained, we study the properties
of the function ϕ(kt). First, note that the function ϕ(kt) takes the value 0 both at kt = 0 and at
kt =
[
λ
− ρ
1+ρ − 1
]1/ρ
> ku, where λ ≡ rµA(1+µ) . Secondly, differentiating (16) we obtain :
ϕ′(kt) = (1 + µ)(1− α)
[
dπt
dkt
− rµ
1 + µ
]
(17)
= (1 + µ)(1− α)A [x(θt)− λ]
where 10
x(θt) ≡ (1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ [1− θt(1 + ρ)]. (18)
Hence ϕ′(kt) > 0 if and only if x(θt) > λ. In the appendix we examine the function x(θ). Since
our assumption that A > r implies λ < 1, we can show that there exists an unique value θ∗ such
that x(θ∗) = λ. Hence there exists a corresponding unique value of kt denoted k∗ such that ϕ(kt) is
increasing in kt for all kt < k∗, and decreasing for kt > k∗ : the function has a unique maximum at k∗.
Moreover, note that ϕ(kt) is concave at least for values of the capital stock less than k = (1+ρρ )
1/ρ.11
The function ϕ(kt) has a unique ﬁxed point, i.e. a steady state denoted k̂ = kt which is given by:
k̂ =
[
b
− ρ
1+ρ − 1
]1/ρ
, (19)
where
b ≡ 1 + rµ(1− α)
A(1− α)(1 + µ) .
.
Note that for an interior steady state to exists, ϕ′(0) has to be greater than 1, which from (17)
requires
A >
1− rµ(1− α)
(1− α)(1 + µ) , (20)
10The function x can be expressed as a function of capital-labour ratio: x(k) = k−(1+ρ)(k−ρ − ρ)(1 + k−ρ)− 1+2ρρ
11See the appendix for an analysis of the second derivative of ϕ(kt).
that is the total factor productivity has to be sufﬁciently large.
Note that from (17) and (19), we obtain that the derivative of ϕ(kt) evaluated at the steady state k̂ is
given by :
ϕ′(k̂) = (1 + µ)(1− α)A
[
ρb
(
1+ρ
ρ b
ρ
1+ρ − 1
)
− λ
]
The slope at the steady state may be positive or negative, depending on whether k̂ is smaller or
greater than k∗.
3.2 The effects of ﬁnancial liberalization
A crucial parameter determining both the dynamics and the type of regime is µ. In this subsection we
examine its impact on ϕ(kt) and we will consider possible regimes in subsection 3.3.
First, differentiating (19) with respect to µ, we can see that dk̂/dµ > 0 provided that r < 1/(1−
α). This condition is satisﬁed for any realistic value of the saving rate. For example, a large value of
(1 − α), say (1 − α) = 0.9 would require r to be less than 1.11, which would certainly be satisﬁed
for any reasonable conﬁguration. In what follows we will suppose that the restriction is satisﬁed so
that a weaker borrowing constraint raises the stationary value of the capital-labour ratio. As we will
see later, this will imply that cycles are more likely to occur at an intermediate stage of ﬁnancial
development than at a stage when the borrowing constraint is tight. Moreover, note that a weaker
borrowing constraint raises also the stationary value of output and of the labour share : dŷ/dµ > 0
and dθ̂/dµ > 0, with:
θ̂ = 1− b ρ1+ρ
and
ŷ = A
(
1− b ρ1+ρ
)1/ρ
.
Second, the derivative of ϕ(kt) with respect to µ is strictly positive provided that kt is less than ku.
Since, as we will see below, the function ϕ(kt) is only deﬁned on [0, ku[, then the maximum of ϕ(kt)
increases with µ.
3.3 Possible regimes
There are two possible regimes: either the economy is always constrained, or the borrowing constraint
eventually stops binding. We examine these in turns.
To do that, recall that k∗ denotes the value of the capital stock at which the function ϕ(kt) reaches
its maximum ϕ(k∗) and that ϕ(k∗) is increasing with µ. This implies that there is a unique value
µu such that for all µ ≥ µu we have ϕ(k∗) ≥ ku. Hence µu deﬁnes the lowest level of ﬁnancial
liberalization which ensures that, at some point in time, entrepreneurs will no longer be constrained.
For all µ < µu, entrepreneurs are always constrained unless the initial capital stock is k0 ≥ ku.
Unfortunately, we cannot get the analytical expression of k∗ which prevent us from obtaining an
expression for µu.
Constrained regime:
If µ < µu then ϕ(k∗) < ku. In this case the dynamics of the capital stock are given by:
kt+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ϕ(kt) if kt < ku
ku if kt ≥ ku
(21)
Note that if the economy starts with an entrepreneurial wealth above ku, entrepreneurs can ﬁnance
the optimal stock ku, and the economy will be at ku for ever.
In this regime, there are various possible dynamics paths:
1. If k̂ < k∗, the capital stock converges monotonically to the steady state.
2. If k̂ > k∗, then various scenarios are possible : monotonic convergence, cyclical convergence,
permanent cycles or divergence.
Three possible cases are depicted graphically in ﬁgures 1, 2 and 3. Figure 1 represents the case
in which the steady state capital stock is to the left of the maximum of the ϕ(kt) schedule, that is
k̂ < k∗. In this case the capital stock increases until it reaches the steady state k̂. Figures 2 and
3 depict, respectively, the case of an economy that converges cyclically and that of a two-period
cycle. Unfortunately, it is not possible to obtain analytical conditions indicating when each of these
scenarios would prevail. Hence, in section 5 we will perform numerical simulations to identify under
which parameter values volatility appears.
[Figure 1 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
Unconstrained Regime:
For a level of ﬁnancial liberalization greater or equal to µu, ϕ(k∗) ≥ ku. This means that there
can be a point at which entrepreneurs are not constrained and which allows them to invest as much as
they want, that is ku. Indeed, ku represents the maximum amount that entrepreneurs want to invest in
their own technology. If ku is reached, the economy stays at this level. In this case, the dynamics of
capital stock are described by :
kt+1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ϕ(kt) if ϕ(kt) < ku and kt < ku
ku otherwise.
Let us deﬁne k˜1 and k˜2 such that ϕ(k˜1) = ϕ(k˜2) = ku with k˜1 < k˜2. Since ϕ(kt) is concave
and dϕ(kt)/dµ > 0 for all kt < ku, then k˜1 is decreasing with µ whereas k˜2 is increasing. Therefore
the higher µ is, the greater the range of values of k for which entrepreneurs will not be constrained
(see ﬁgure 4). In the unconstrained regime, the economy will converge to ku, either monotonically or
cyclically depending on the value of µ > µu and the initial level of capital (See in appendix ﬁgures
10).12
[Figure 4 about here.]
12Note that if |ϕ′(k̂)| < 1, it is in principle possible that an economy which is initially in the neighborhood of k̂ converges
to this steady state. Nevertheless, we have not been able to obtain this outcome in any of our numerical simulations.
4 Alternative deﬁnition of proﬁts
So far we have assumed that labour is paid at the end of each period, and hence proﬁts are deﬁned as
Πt = Yt−wtL. Aghion et al. (2004) use an alternative assumption. They assume that wages are paid
at the beginning of each period. This has important consequences for the dynamics of wealth. Under
their assumption, total wealth at the beginning of the period is used to ﬁnance both wages and new
capital, that is
Kt = (1 + µ)Wt − wtL. (22)
This in turn implies that ‘proﬁts’ are equivalent to output, i.e.
Πt = Yt = A[1 + k
−ρ
t ]
−1/ρL, (23)
Note that, contrary, to our previous setup, proﬁts are always increasing in the capital stock. The
equation driving the accumulation of wealth is now
Wt+1 = (1− α)[Yt − rµWt]. (24)
Clearly the negative effect of an increase in entrepreneurs’ wealth Wt on next period wealth Wt+1
comes solely from the impact of debt repayment. If we compare this expression to that in equation
(14), that is
Wt+1 = (1− α)[(1− θt)Yt − rµWt], (25)
we can see that when wages are paid at the end of the period there are two effects that tend to reduce
future wealth: debt repayment and the fact that, as the capital stock increases, the labour share θt also
increases, thus reducing proﬁtability for any given level of output.
The question that arises, then, is whether the assumption on the payment of labour affects the
likelihood that cyclical behavior is observed. To address this question we obtain the dynamic equation
for capital under the assumption that labour is paid at the beginning of the period.13 From (22) and
13We derive the dynamic equation here as Aghion et al. (2004) do not do so in their paper. Their analytical results are
obtained only for the case of a Leontieff production function, and the case of CES production is only examined numerically.
(24) we ﬁnd that the dynamics of capital per worker are governed by:
kt+1 = (1 + µ)(1− α)
[
yt − rµ1 + µwt −
rµ
1 + µ
kt
]
− wt+1, (26)
which implicitly deﬁnes kt+1 as a function of kt, i.e. kt+1 = ψ(kt). The dynamic equation for capital
is again non-monotonic in kt.
To examine the dynamics of kt, we differentiate equation (26) to obtain
dkt+1
dkt
= (1 + µ)(1− α)[dyt
dkt
− rµ
1 + µ
− rµ
1 + µ
dwt
dkt
]− dwt+1
dkt
. (27)
Noting that
dyt
dkt
= A(1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ , (28)
dwt
dkt
= A(1 + ρ)θt(1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ , (29)
dwt+1
dkt
=
dwt+1
dkt+1
dkt+1
dkt
= A(1 + ρ)(1− θt+1)
1+ρ
ρ θt+1
dkt+1
dkt
, (30)
and substituting for these expressions into (27) we have
dkt+1
dkt
=
(1 + µ)(1− α)A
1 + A(1 + ρ)(1− θt+1)
1+ρ
ρ θt+1
[
(1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ (1− λA(1 + ρ)θt)− λ
]
. (31)
As before, we concentrate in the case in which λ < 1. In this case, the ψ(kt) schedule is increasing
if and only if
z(θt) > λ,
where
z(θt) ≡ (1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ (1− λA(1 + ρ)θt) (32)
It is possible to compare the dynamic schedules obtained under the two assumptions for proﬁts
(see appendix) and show that the maximum of ψ(kt), denoted θ∗A is to the right of the maximum of
ϕ(kt), θ∗, as long as
r < 1 +
1
µ
, (33)
that is, if the net interest rate is less than the inverse of µ factor. This is a reasonable condition, as will
become apparent in our numerical simulations in section 5.3. For instance, if the net interest rate is
0.05, this condition is satisﬁed for µ < 20.
If condition (33) holds, it is then more likely that cyclical behavior takes place when wages are
paid at the end than at the beginning of periods. The intuition for this is clear from equations (24) and
(25). For Aghion et al. there is a single mechanism that tends to reduce wealth as the capital stock
increases : the cost of debt repayment. In this case, wealth -and hence the capital stock- increase
as long as proﬁts, which they deﬁne as equal to output, increase faster than the cost of repaying
the debt, rµWt. In our setup, there is a further force tending to reduce the wealth of entrepreneurs,
namely, the increase in the labour share brought about by a higher capital stock. Since the labour
share increases with k, proﬁts grow more slowly than output does. At the same time, the debt burden
rµWt is increasing just as for Aghion et al., implying that the reduction in entrepreneurial wealth will
come about for a lower level of the capital stock than when proﬁts are equal to Yt.
5 Numerical examples
5.1 Financial liberalization and cycles
Our analytical results indicate that several patterns of dynamic behavior are possible. In this section we
perform numerical simulation to see what type of dynamics prevail for reasonable parameter values.
We follow closely the calibrations in Aghion et al. (2004) and set the parameter values as follows:14
total factor productivity A = 3, the gross interest rate r = 1.02, the consumption-to-income ratio
α = 0.7, and ρ = 2. This last value corresponds to an elasticity of substitution between capital and
labour of 1/3.
We start by considering the role of ﬁnancial liberalization and how it generates cycles, and do
so by examining the dynamics of the capital stock for different degrees of ﬁnancial liberalization,
ranging from µ =1 to µ = 4.5. Aghion at al. (2004) use a value of µ = 4 in their simulations, which
14See Aghion et al. (2004) for a discussion of the evidence supporting these choices.
implies that entrepreneurs must have assets equal to one ﬁfth of their total investment, a plausible
value. Table 1 gives the steady state capital-labour ratios and per capita income levels for the various
values of µ. As we saw analytically, greater ﬁnancial liberalization is associated with higher steady
state capital and output. However, the economy does not converge to its steady state for either µ = 3.5
or µ = 4 . For µ = 3.5, capital and output oscillate on 2-periods cycles, taking alternatively the values
k1 = 0.5098 and k2 = 0.9140 for capital and y1 = 1.3625 and y2 = 2.0240 for output. Note that the
average value of output is 1.6932, and thus lower than the steady state value 1.8013.
[Table 1 about here.]
The effect of µ on the dynamic behavior is depicted in ﬁgures 5(a) to 5(e). Figure 5(a) considers
the case in which µ = 1. There is very limited borrowing and this implies that the steady state
capital stock and per capita output will be low. However, the economy is characterized by stability
as it converges monotonically to its steady state. As ﬁnancial markets liberalize, output per capita
increases. For µ = 2.5 the economy still converges to its steady state although with oscillations.
For µ = 3.5 there is no convergence, but rather the economy oscillates permanently generating a
two-period cycle. 4-period oscillations are obtained for µ = 4 . These examples indicate that greater
ﬁnancial market liberalization results in greater volatility as long as entrepreneurs are credit constraint.
However, above the threshold level of ﬁnancial liberalization µu, entrepreneurs will eventually not be
credit constrained and will be able to invest the optimal level of capital ku. For our set of parameter
values, ku takes the value 1.0261 and µu is equate to 4.2. This case is depicted in ﬁgure 5(e).
[Figure 5 about here.]
5.2 The role of the elasticity of substitution
We next turn to the role played by the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital. For
ρ > 0, that is, when labour and capital are complements, capital accumulation increases the labour
share, which tends to erode proﬁts. Since the labour share is given by θ = 1/(1 + k−ρ), the lower
the elasticity of substitution in production, the more responsive the labour share is to changes in
the capital-labour ratio. As a result, proﬁts will decline faster with k, making it more likely that
ﬂuctuations occur. This is exactly what we observe in ﬁgures 8 to 13. Following Aghion et al. (2004),
we pose µ = 4 and allow ρ to vary from 0.7 to 2, which implies that the elasticity of substitution
elasticity varies between 0.58 and 0.33. We can see that as the complementarity between capital and
labour increases, cycles appear. A 2-period cycle appears for an elasticity of substitution of 0.36.
These ﬁgures indicate that the behavior of the labour share, which is in turn determined by ρ, plays an
important role in creating ﬂuctuations.
[Figure 6 about here.]
5.3 The role of the labour share
Lastly, we provide numerical examples that help us understand the role that the labour share plays in
creating volatility through its effect on wealth dynamics. In our benchmark economy in which wages
are paid at the end of periods, proﬁts are then given by Πt = (1 − θt)Yt and hence wealth dynamics
are driven by the equation Wt+1 = (1 − α)[(1 − θt)Yt − rµWt]. Recall that in Aghion et al., wages
are paid at the beginning of periods, implying that proﬁts are equal to output Πt = Yt and hence
Wt+1 = (1− α)[Yt − rµWt].
We set A = 3, r = 1.02, α = 0.7, as above, ﬁx the elasticity of substitution at 1/3 (i.e. ρ = 2) and
allow the degree of ﬁnancial liberalization µ to vary. Table 2 reports the patterns obtained for different
values of µ under the two scenarios. We can see that in line with our analytical results in section 4, the
labour share plays an important role in creating cycles. When Πt = Yt, the possibilities for borrowing
must be substantial - at least µ = 9- for the economy to exhibit a two-period cycle. In contrast, when
we allow the labour share to affect proﬁtability a much lower value of µ -namely, µ = 3.5- sufﬁces to
generate permanent oscillations.
[Table 2 about here.]
Financial liberalization not only increases output volatility but as we have already argued, economies
opening up their ﬁnancial markets are more prone to ﬁnancial crises. As we have discussed, Diwan
(1999) maintains that the labour share increase before a ﬁnancial crisis and falls after the crisis, and
raises the question of causality. Our model shows that when ﬁnancial markets open up, the labour
share increases, eroding proﬁtability which in turn reduces borrowing possibilities and triggers the
ﬁnancial crisis. Figures 7(a) and 7(b) depict the behavior of the capital-labour ratio, the labour share,
output and wages. As we have argued, wages represent the real exchange rate since labour is immo-
bile across countries. We suppose that the economy has initially a low level of ﬁnancial development,
µ =2.5, and that it is at its steady state. Then, ﬁnancial market liberalization takes places resulting in
a higher borrowing ratio, µ = 4.15
[Figure 7 about here.]
Figure 14 shows that following ﬁnancial liberalization the exchange rate appreciates and the labour
share increases. One period latter, at t=2, the capital stock increases. The rise of the labour share
erodes proﬁtability and induces the ﬁnancial crisis, captured by the fall in the exchange rate at t=3.
Note that the labour share also falls at this point. Figure 15 also depicts the dynamics of output, and
indicate that the labour share and the exchange rate (wage rate) move together and are countercyclical.
6 Conclusion
A large literature has argued that ﬁnancial liberalization is beneﬁcial for growth as it results in a
better allocation of savings, diversiﬁcation, and budget austerity policies aimed at attracting funds.
Yet the evidence concerning the late 20th century indicates that ﬁnancial liberalization can also create
output volatility in emerging economies; and as Ramey and Ramey (1995) show, higher volatility is
associated to lower growth. Our paper has shown how the labour share plays an important role in
explaining why liberalizing ﬁnancial markets create volatility.
Our analysis follows Aghion et al. (2004) and describes a dynamic open economy in which
entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Contrary to these authors, proﬁts are deﬁned as output minus
the wage bill, and as a result movements in the labour share affect proﬁtability. Since the amount that
can be borrowed by entrepreneurs is assumed to be proportional to the entrepreneur’s wealth, this has
important implications for the dynamics of the economy. Under the assumption of complementarity
between labour and capital, the increase in the capital stock due to ﬁnancial liberalization increases
15All other parameters values are the same as above.
the labour share and tends to reduce proﬁts. This effect adds to the debt repayment effect analyzed by
Aghion et al. (2004), and results in ﬂuctuations for much lower levels of ﬁnancial development.
The dynamics of the model imply that when ﬁnancial markets open up, the real exchange rate
appreciates and the labour share increases, which erodes proﬁtability and triggers the ﬁnancial crisis.
The resulting decline in output is then accompanied by a reduction in the labour share. Our results
thus provide a possible explanation for the evidence provided by Diwan (1999) who ﬁnds that the
labour share increases before a ﬁnancial crisis and falls sharply after it. This indicates that ﬁnancial
crises are likely to have important consequences for the distribution of income. This is a question
which remains to be examined.
7 Appendix
7.1 Capital accumulation and individual proﬁts
In the text we have shown that, in equilibrium, proﬁts are ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing in the
capital stock. However, from the point of view of an individual entrepreneur who takes the wage rate
as given, proﬁts are strictly increasing in his own capital stock. To verify this consider the proﬁts of
entrepreneur j, deﬁned as Πj = F [Kj , Lj ] − wLj . The optimal level of employment can then be
obtained from proﬁt maximization and shown to be proportional to the capital stock:
Lj =
[(
A
w
) ρ
1+ρ − 1
]1/ρ
Kj .
We can then write proﬁts as
Πj = w
[(
A
w
) ρ
1+ρ − 1
] 1+ρ
ρ
Kj .
Then ∂Πj/ ∂Kj > 0 as long as the term in square brackets is positive, which for ρ > 0 is the case
if and only if A > w. Recall that w =A[1 + k−ρ]−
1+ρ
ρ , which implies A > w for all k.
7.2 Concavity of Proﬁts
In order to check whether proﬁts are concave, differentiate (5) to get
d2πt
dk2t
= −
A(1 + ρ)(1 + k−ρt )−1/ρ
[
kρt − ρk2ρt + ρkρt
]
k2t (1 + k
ρ
t )3
,
implying that
d2πt
dk2t
> 0 if kt > k ≡
(
1 + ρ
ρ
)1/ρ
.
Note that k > k since for ρ > 0, ((1 + ρ)/ρ)1/ρ > ρ−1/ρ. Therefore, if capital is less than the
threshold level k, then proﬁts are concave. In other words, as long as proﬁts are increasing in k they
will also be concave. Clearly, if proﬁts are concave so is the dynamics equation for capital as
d2kt+1
dk2t
= (1 + µ)(1− α)d
2πt
dk2t
7.3 Study of the function x(θ)
Recall that x(θ) = (1 − θ) 1+ρρ [1− θt(1 + ρ)]. x(θ) takes the value 1 at θ = 0 and 0 at θ = 1.
Moreover, differentiating x(θ) we have:
dx(θ)
dθ
= −(1 + ρ)(1− θ)1/ρ
[
1− θ (1 + ρ)
ρ
+ 1− θ
]
.
Hence x(θ) is decreasing if θ < 1+ρ1+2ρ ≡ θ and increasing for θ > θ. The function x(θ) crosses
the abscises axe at θ = 11+ρ ≡ θ < θ and is convex.
The function x(θ) is depicted in ﬁgure (8). Since λ < 1, there exists a unique value of the labour
share θ∗ such that x(θ) > λ if θ < θ∗and x(θ) < λ otherwise.
[Figure 8 about here.]
7.4 The dynamics of the labour share and wages
We turn now to the dynamic behavior of the labour share. Substituting for θ in equation (16), we
obtain the dynamics of the labour share which are governed by
θt+1 =
[
1 +
1− θt
θt
[A(1 + µ)(1− α)]−ρ
[
(1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ − λ
]−ρ]−1
. (34)
Differentiating
dθt+1
dθt
=
θt+1
kt+1
dkt+1
dkt
kt
θt
,
which, since θt+1/kt+1 and kt/θt are both positive, implies that the sign of dθt+1/dθt is the same as
that of dkt+1/dkt. Hence
dθt+1
dθt
> 0 if and only if θ < θ
∗
. (35)
That is, the labour share has the same behavior as capital. Lastly, recalling that the wage is give by
wt = A
(
1 + k−ρt
)− 1+ρ
ρ , it is clear that wages will also move together with the capital stock.
7.5 Comparison of the functions x(θ) and z(θ)
We have shown that when wages are paid at the end of each period, dkt+1/dkt > 0 if and only if
x(θt) > λ, and that this condition turns to be z(θt) > λ if wages are paid at the beginning.
Lets us compare the functions x(θt) and z(θt) where
x(θt) = (1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ [1− θt(1 + ρ)] ,
and
z(θt) = (1− θt)
1+ρ
ρ (1− λAθt(1 + ρ)) .
Both x(θ) and z(θ) take the value 1 at θ = 0 and 0 at θ = 1. We have shown that x′(θ) > 0 if
and only if θ < θ ≡ (1 + ρ)/(1 + 2ρ), now we can show that z′(θ) > 0 if and only if θ < θA ≡
(1 + ρλA)/(Aλ(1 + 2ρ)). Besides, x(θ) takes the value of 0 at θ ≡ θ = 1/(1 + ρ) and z(θ) at
θ ≡ θA = 1/(λA(1 + ρ)). The two functions are depicted in ﬁgure (9). The function x(θ) can
be below or above z(θ) , depending on the condition r < 1 + 1/µ. If this condition holds, then
x(θ) ≤ z(θ) for all θ and we have θ < θA and θ < θA.
[Figure 9 about here.]
We had deﬁned θ∗ as the value of the labour share such that x(θ∗) = λ, and let deﬁne θ∗A such
that z(θ∗A) = λ. Provided that r < 1 + 1/µ, θ
∗ is to the left of θ∗A. This means that the point at which
kt+1 begins to decrease in kt occurs sooner when wages are paid at the end of the period that when
they are paid at the beginning.
7.6 Convergence to ku
[Figure 10 about here.]
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Figures
Figure 1: Monotonic convergence to the stable steady state
Figure 2: Cyclical convergence to the stable steady state
Figure 3: A stable period-2 cycle
Figure 4: Unconstrained regime
(a) Monotonic convergence to
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of capital
Figure 5: Financial liberalization and cyclical behavior
(a) Monotonic convergence to the
stable steady state
(b) Cyclical convergence to the sta-
ble steady state
(c) Cyclical convergence to the sta-
ble steady state
(d) 2-period cycles
(e) 4-period cycles
Figure 6: Elasticity of substitution and cyclical behavior
(a) Short-run response to ﬁnancial liberalization
(b) Long-run response to ﬁnancial liberalization
Figure 7: Responses to ﬁnancial liberalization
Figure 8: x(θ)
Figure 9: x(θ) and z(θ)
(a) Monotonic convergence to ku
(b) Cyclical convergence to ku
Figure 10: Convergence to ku
Tables
Table 1: Steady state values for different level of ﬁnancial integration
k̂ k1 k2 ŷ y1 y2
µ = 1 0.4883 1.3164
µ = 1.7 0.6059 1.5546
µ = 2.5 0.6865 1.6980
µ = 3.5 0.7509 0.5098 0.9140 1.8013 1.3625 2.0240
µ = 4 0.7744 1.8368
µ = 4.2 ku = 1.0260 yu = 2.1484
Table 2: The role of the labour share in cyclicity
µ 1 2.5 3.5 4 4.5 9 10.5
Π = Y Con. Con. Con. Con. Cy.con. 2P Unc.
Π = (1− θ)Y Con. Cy.Con. 2P Cycles Unc Unc Unc.
Legend: Con.: monotonic convergence; Cy.con:cyclical convergence; 2P: 2-period cycles; Cycles:
Cycles of period greater than 2; Unc: Unconstrained regime
